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ABSTRACT
The mode oftransporting crude oil via pipelines was understood to have
a potential for a very large volume offluids to be released from the
pipeline system. This incident will pose its small but finite risk to both
population and environment along the route. This paper discusses the
potential hazards usually encountered in the transporting crude oil using
pipeline. The risk, consequence, and risk reducing measures are also
presented. It is found that the pipeline mode oftransporting crude is safe
and reliable. Fatalities per ton-kilometer transported are much lower
than for any other means oftransportation.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Risk is the potential for realisation of unwanted, negative consequences of an event
or combination of events to individual groups of people or to physical and biological
systems. Generally, risk is considered as a monolithic concept which considers only
the probability and consequences of events.
The intent of this paper is to show that the risk associated with the
transportation of crude oil is ideal complex and requires a coherent, well-structured
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and acceptable methodology to determine acceptable levels of risk for society and
the environment to undertake.
Pipeline is a safe and reliable mode of transportation. Fatalities per ton
kilometer transported are much lower than for any other means or transportation.
The amount of oil spilled per unit transported is also very low. Pipelines in general
therefore represent a small risk to human life and to environment [I]. However,
pipelines represent large capital cost, and any pipeline failure has significant
economic impact because of the cost of repair ant the lost of transportation capacity.
2.0 ROUTE OF TRANSPORTATION
The route that the pipeline would take has to be carefully chosen. The size of
pipelines hence the capacity of transportation as well as the existence of other mode
of transportation is evaluated. The pipeline has to be built and laid in accordance
with standard industry practice. Major populated areas should be avoided if possible
otherwise due safety measures, e.g. right distance from housing estate must be
observed. The conservation of natural reserves must also be taken into consideration
when planning the route.
3.0 RISK ANALYSIS
The term risk assessment is the quantitative evaluation of the likelihood of undesired
ev.ents and the likelihood of harm and damage being caused, together with the-value
judgements made concerning the significance of the results. For each event that
occurs, there are a variety of consequences that can occur. For example, for the
event involving the occurrence of crude oil spillage from pipeline, the consequence
range from human injury, effect on flora-fauna to fire.
The consequences of the hazard are usually determined in terms of:
Potential harm to human
Damage to property
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By combining the level of hazard with the frequency of occurrence, the risk
to personnel, property and environment can be predicted. Event trees can be used to
evaluate the probability of each out come and hence the overall risks, refer Figure 1.
While fault tree can be used to identify the sequence of incident leading to the major
event as shown in Figure 2.
Oil Spill
I
Fig. I Consequences Of Oil Spill
Pipeline Leak I Rupture
Fig. 2 Fault Tree For Pipeline Rupture / Leakage
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In the risk analysis ofpipeline system, there are four stages as follow [3];
1. The identification of the potential hazards
11. The likely frequency of occurrence of those hazards
111. The consequences of these hazards
IV. The assessment of the risks
3.1 Identification of Potential Hazards
The identification of the potential hazards may be entirely straight forward,
however, in the case of onshore pipeline it may requires rigorous, systematic
analysis due to its vast area coverage. Here, hazards are identified by three separate
methods;
First A checklist, which simply categories the process into small
readily identifiable units, and then considers the potential hazards
of each unit.
Second: A qualitative review is carried out. This review alms to use
experience of other similar systems and practical experience of
the operation of such systems to pick out the likely hazards.
Third A coarse hazard and operability study would be carried out. This
type of study is much smaller version of the full HAZOP
technique. Its purpose is to look at failures in the systems be they
leaks, control failures and how they might arise, then to look at
the response of the system to the failures.
Potential hazards that might occur on the pipeline can be grouped as follows;
1. Natural Hazards
a. External corrosion
b. Thermal effect
c. Abrasion and chafing
d. Erosion
e. Earthquake
f. Landslide
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11. Manmade Hazards
a. Operator error
b. Equipment inadequacies
c. Equipment malfunction
d. Internal corrosion
e. Fire and explosion
f. Undetected damage during construction
g. Material deficiencies
h. Poor quality control
i. Design deficiencies
The severity and the likelihood of these hazards are summarised in Table I.
Table I Summary of Severity and Likelihood of Potential Hazards
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3.2 The Likely Frequency of Occurrence
An important part of a risk analysis is the need to place the hazards from one part of
the installation in perspective with the other hazards to which the installation may be
subjected. In order to predict the frequency of occurrence, as well as assessing its
consequences one should consider every issue related to pipelines from construction,
commission to operation. The relative importance is use as a basis for decisions on
where best to expend effort in risk reduction. The only way to be able to make such
distinctions is based on their expected frequency of occurrence . This in turn must
come from the historical accident record.
3.2.1 Relative frequency ofoccurrence
Check with historical accident data, e.g. Figure 3 and Table 2 [2]. From
Figure 3, it can be deduced that the overall failure rate of these pipelines
during the fifteen years period shows a marginally increasing trend. It is
expected that a leakage incident likely to occur once for every Ix I013 tonne-
km of product transported. Table 2 shows current failure frequencies
predicted for large crude oil carrying transmission pipelines operating in
Western Europe [2].
Fig. 3 Failure Frequency Trend For European Crude Oil
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3.2.2 The risk in perspective - The absolute frequency.
The estimated mean failure rate of significant leakage from pipeline.
Table 2. Predicted Frequency of Failure [2]
Failure Cause Predicted Frequency
10-5 km- I yr"
Indigenous-mechanical 14.7
Indigenous-corrosion 8.8
Operator error 8.8
Third party activities 2.0
Environmental causes 2.0
3.3 The Consequences of Leakage
With high-pressure pipeline, crack of even small dimensions may results in sizeable
release. Section 7 in this paper discusses further this issue.
3.4 Assessment of Risk
Having examined the type and ongin of the hazards, the expected frequency
compare against other hazards and the consequences of the hazards, the final steps
are to summarise the risk picture and to assess the significant of the results.
There are many different ways of presenting and assessing the risk. These include;
ranking
criteria for risk to risk to individual employees
criteria for society or public risk
criteria for total pipeline risk
criteria for preventive safety measures against each hazards, (e.g. API
RP14C)
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e. material deficiencies
f. design deficiencies
g. medium volume spillage
h. third party's impact on pipeline
iii. Major hazards
a. large volume spillage
b. fire and explosion
c. pipeline rupture
d. subsidence
e. landwash/landslide
IV. Catastrophic
a. Landslide
b. Earthquake
c. very large spillage
3.4.1 Potential accident in terms oflocation and circumstances.
Small volume release in remote areas poses a minor hazard to the
environment and human. Affected areas could easily be cleaned. Erosion as
well as abrasion and chafing poses a minor hazards and regular inspection are
required to ensure that the rate is within tolerable limit.
3.4.2 Quantification
Releases can be due to several causes as listed in Section 4. Following that,
shut down is expected on average of 60 minutes for a leak. Great amount of
crude losses (>50 tonnes) is anticipated during depressurisation. It is also
anticipated that without any artificial depressurisation by pumping one third
to one half of the contents of the pipeline stretch so damage to be lost. To
minimise this, several shutdown systems would be placed along the route
depending on the length (and other parameters) of the pipeline. Frequencies of
9
Jurnal Mekanikal, Jilid 1, 1998
release referring to Table 2, giving the worst case due to mechanical failure
with predicted values of 14.7xl0-5 per km-yr. This is equal to 0.027 times per
year; i.e. once in every 37 years.
4.0 FAILURE TRENDS
Each year there are hundreds of pipeline failures, resulting in pollution, loss in
transportation capacity and costly repair expenses. Most of the failures occur on
onshore pipeline because they cover a much greater distance.
The incident related to crude transportation via pipeline can be divided into five
groups as the following, [2,5];
1. Indigenous-mechanical
Those incidents likely to have been cause by growth of pre-
commissioning defects in the pipe material, and which may have been
introduced during fabrication or construction. The category could include
for example, welding defects, lamination, stress-corrosion cracking, etc.
2. Indigenous-corrosion
Those indents attributed directly to corrosion and resulting from loss of
material since commissioning.
3. Operator error
Those incidents occurring through poor operation, maintenance, etc.
4. Third party
Those incidents caused by third parties, for example following impact by
excavators, augers, etc.
5. Environmental
Those incidents cause by subsidence, land washout due to heavy rain,
etc.
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5.0 FAILURE RATE
Figure 3 shows the trend of pipeline failure frequency in Western Europe [2],
operating in the mid 1970s from which one could made a valid prediction of
indigenous defects and their related rate of failures .
Failure frequencies predicted for large crude-oil carrying transmission pipeline are
shown in Table 2 [2]. These values are estimated from the final trend period shown
in Figure 3.
6.0 OIL SPILLS
The mode of transporting crude via pipeline was understood to have a potential for a
very large volume of fluid to be released from the pipeline system. For each spillage
scenario, the relative likelihood of different consequences has been estimated and
these are shown on the event tree in Figure 5. The range of the harmful effects from
each of these consequences are then calculated taking into account any topological,
weather or mitigation features that are relevant
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There are two practical approaches to the estimation of release quantity given a
pipeline incident; firstly a historic approach, considering the quantities which have
been released in the past, and secondly a deterministic approach, incorporating
modelling of the outflow rate and duration, given a particular hole size [2].
Frequency estimation is based on Concowe database, allows the former approach to
be adopted, as the quantity of fluid release is reported for each release incident. The
contribution of the various failure modes to the total commulative probability versus
spill volume relationship is presented in Figure 6. Table 3 shows the relationship
between spill volume distribution and failure cause. From Figure 7, one can predict
that the most likely failure mode to result in large spillage (rupture type) events is
that classed as indigenous-mechanical.
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Fig. 7 Spill Volume Frequency By Failure Causes For European
Crude Oil Pipeline z 16in Diameter - CONCAWE Data [2]
7.0 CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS
Each consequence has its own description and may result from more than one event.
For each event with multiple consequences, there is a probability associated with the
occurrence of a specific consequence based upon the condition that the event occurs.
Thus, the probability of a consequence occurring depends on the probability of an
event occurring, the probability of a specific consequence occurring if the event
takes place, and the aggregation of these compound probabilities from all events that
lead to the specific consequence.
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Table 3 The Relationship Between Spill Volume Distribution And Failure Cause
For European Crude Oil Transmission Pipelines [2]
Relative Probability
Of Occurrence
Failure Cause <70 70 to 360 >360
m3 m3 m3
Third party 0.45 0.41 0.14
Indigenous-mechanical 0.56 0.20 0.24
Indigenous-corrosion 0.86 0.08 0.06
Operator error 0.83 0.15 0.02
Environmental 0.17 0.30 0.53
This analysis shows that the estimated distribution of spill volume is
dependent to a high degree on the cause of failure
Consequence analysis is the determination of the possible outcome of the hazard for
non-hydrocarbon events, this may include;
Structure failure
Impact damage
For hydrocarbon events, this may include;
Discharge of (pressurised) fluids
Spread of liquids
Figure 8 shows the possible consequences of pipeline operation on environment,
Figure 9 shows the possible consequences ofpipeline construction.
8.0 RISK REDUCING MEASURE
At this stage, the risks analysis of pipeline is complete, the potential hazards have
been identified, their likelihood and consequences examined.
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8.1 Ways of Minimising the Probability of Leakage
Minimising the probability of damage to pipeline and the associated systems
can be achieved in two ways;
Corrosion protection
Bury the pipeline
8.1.1 Corrosion protection
An effective corrosion control programs is essential if the operator is
to avoid the high cost of leak repair, pipeline replacement, clean-up,
production shut down, damage equipment, etc, and the attendant risk
of continuing operation in a partially corroded situation beyond safe
limit.
The methods of controlling external corrosion are generally used,
namely protective coatings and or cathodic protection [3J.
8.1.2 Bury the pipeline
Burying the pipeline will significantly reduce the risk of damage due
to external elements. However, proper and correct preparation must
be observed to support the pipeline at suitable location and interval.
8.2 Ways of Minimising the Consequences of Leakage
Emergency shut down operation (ESD) is incorporated in the pipeline system
as discussed in Section 4. There may be several shutdown systems required
for the pipeline between the start to the end of the transportation line.
9.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
1. Transportation of hydrocarbon by what ever means, will pose its own small but
finite risk to both population and environment along the route and also risk of
potentially major economic loss for the operator involved.
16
Jurnal Mekanikal, Jilid 1, 1998
1. Transportation of hydrocarbon by what ever means, will pose its own small but
finite risk to both population and environment along the route and also risk of
potentially major economic loss for the operator involved.
2. It can be concluded that the risk of catastrophic and major events as mentioned
in Section 4 to environment and peoples are very small.
3. The worse case of failure frequencies is due to mechanical failure with predicted
occurrence of once in every 37 years.
4. Transporting crude oil via pipeline IS safe and reliable. Fatalities per ton-
kilometer transported are much lower than for any other means of transportation.
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